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PUNITIVE-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN LABOR
RELATIONS LITIGATION
MAXWELL BRANDWENt
UCH OF the controversy which was generated by the doctrine of
punitive-exemplary damages about a century ago has subsided.1
True, some thirty years ago, a study proposed re-examining the
effectiveness of the doctrine as a legal tool.2 Despite the forceful criticism
3
levelled against it, the doctrine has found a firm footing in our system of
law.4 Only a handful of states have held out against it.5 Return to this con-
troversy might be regarded as vain, were it not that the doctrine has been
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., 1917, L.L.B., 1921, Harvard University.
I The controversy involved Professors Greenleaf and Sedgwick. The former opposed the
doctrine, whereas the latter favored it. See Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 387
(1866). See also references in Luther v. Shaw, 57 Wis. 237, 238, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (1914).
2 Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
3 The doctrine has been termed "a pernicious doctrine", a "heresy" and a "deformity."
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). See also Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119
(1884). It was termed an "incongruity" and "a sin against sound judicial principle' in
Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 286, 288 (1878).
4 It has been followed in at least forty states and in the federal courts. McCoRImcK,
DAMAGES § 78 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 390 (9th
ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as SEDGWICKI. It is also incorporated in the Restatement of Torts.
4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 908 (1939). But cf. "It is probable that, in the framing of a model
code of damages to-day for use in a country unhampered by legal tradition, the doctrine of
exemplary damages would find no place". MCCORMICK 276 (1935).
5 Massachusetts, Nebraska, Washington, Louisiana, New Hampshire. In Indiana, puni-
tive-exemplary damages may not be awarded if the defendant would be liable to criminal
prosecution for the same offense. Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878). A forceful opinion
against the doctrine was written in Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119 (1884). This
opinion was overturned by subsequent legislation, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (1953).
Wisconsin, on the other hand, observes the doctrine, despite its disapproval thereof. The
court suggested that the doctrine be rejected by legislation. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282
(1878).
"Damages are given as a compensation or satisfaction to the plaintiff for an injury ac-
tually sustained by him from the defendant. They should be precisely commensurate with
the injury, neither more nor less." 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 242 (2d ed. 1848). The foregoing
rule of damages was quoted with approval in Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash.
45, 51, 25 Pac. 1072, 1073 (1891). "The damages recovered are measured in all cases by the
injury caused. Vindictive or punitive damages are never allowed in this State." Per Holmes,
J., in Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245, 28 N.E. 1, 5 (1891).
6 International Union, UAW, v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958). United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), involved, inter alia, an award of punitive-
exemplary damages, but the court limited its review to whether the National Labor Relations
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common law tort action.
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extended to labor relations cases in recent years.6 This development war-
rants a re-assessment of the doctrine. To direct this study, we rely on the
luminous remarks of Mr. Justice Holmes: "So in regard to the formulas of the
law, I have found it very instructive to consider what may be the postulates
implied. They are generically two: that such and such a condition or result
is desirable and that such and such means are appropriate to bring it
about." 7 Applying those postulates to the present study two salient ques-
tions must be faced: is the concept of punitive-exemplary damages a de-
sirable and effective legal tool and, more specifically, does it have any legiti-
mate place in labor relations litigation?
A Texas court recently awarded $1,265,896 to twenty-eight former em-
ployees who lost their jobs during a strike called by the International Union
of Operating Engineers. 8 The award, in principle, was not unlike that sus-
tained by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Union,
UA W v. Russell.9 In the latter case, plaintiff, a non-striker, claimed that in
the course of a strike he was prevented by threats of bodily harm from re-
turning to work for a period of five weeks. A jury awarded him damages of
$10,000. Five hundred dollars represented lost wages; the remaining $9,500
were punitive-exemplary damages.' 0 Twenty-nine similar suits, seeking re-
covery of approximately $1,500,000, awaited the decision in the Russell
case." The Texas jury and court went farther; they awarded compensatory
and punitive-exemplary damages to the twenty-eight plaintiffs. These cases
raise anew the thorny issue of the desirability of punitive-exemplary damages
as a tool in tort actions.
7 HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1920).
8 Casida v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Civil No. 10884, D. Tex.,
March 14, 1962. In another recent case, involving a libel growing out of an industrial dis-
pute, a trial judge awarded general damages of $ 100,000 and punitive-exemplary damages
of $50,000. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO. N.Y. Times, November 26, 1961, p.48.
However, whether the award be made by jury or trial judge, the force of the criticism of the
doctrine remains unimpaired.
9 356 U.S. 634 (1958). The Russell case involved the question of exclusive and pre-emptive
jurisdiction in the National Labor Relations Board. The majority of the Court held that the
state courts could properly award damages for tortious conduct, even though such conduct
also constituted an unfair labor practice within the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. This
paper will not deal with the problem of the respective jurisdiction of the state and federal
courts.
10 356 U.S. at 652 n.10. Some authorities prefer the simple term "exemplary damages."
SEDGWICK 688. Others call them "punitive" or "vindictive" damages. "It seems that the
terms exemplary, vindictive, punitive, imaginary, presumptive, speculative and smart money
are used in law as synonymous." Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 386 (1866). Al-
though the Restatement of Torts uses the term "punitive damages," one of the "comments"
uses the term "exemplary damages." § 908, comment (1939). This article will use the term
punitive-exemplary damages because of their dual aspect: punishment and an example to
others.
11 356 U.S. at 657, 658 (1958).
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1
Although in the Roman, Civil, and Scottish law, punitive-exemplary
damages appear to have been unknown,12 the doctrine has had a long his-
tory in the common law. It stems from the famous eighteenth century case
of Huckle v. Money.13 In an attempt to suppress John Wilkes' journal, The
North Briton, a general warrant, naming no person, was issued by the Secre-
tary of State to arrest printers of the paper. The plaintiff, a journeyman
printer, was seized and imprisoned for six hours under the warrant. A jury
awarded damages of £ 300 against the arresting officer. The defendant, al-
leging excessive damages, moved for a new trial. In denying this application,
Lord Chief Justice Pratt' 4 said:
The personal injury done to [the plaintiff] was very small, so that if the
jury had been confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury
only, perhaps £ 20 damages would have been thought damages suffi-
cient.., but the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderable-
ness of his station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that strik-
ing light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the subject
appeared to them.... I think they have done right in giving exemplary
damages. To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order
to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under
which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring
public attack upon the liberty of the subject.Is
Having affirmed the jury's right to award punitive-exemplary damages,
Lord Chief Justice Pratt also acknowledged a limitation on the jury's free-
dom of action. 16 This limitation was adopted in a subsequent case' 7 when
121 SEDGWicK 701; SALMOND, TORTS § 33 (9th ed. 1936). See also Murphy v. Hobbs, 7
Colo. 541, 545, 5 Pac. 119, 122 (1884). Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873).
13 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
14 Later Lord Camden. At that time, freedom of the press was a burning issue. In another
case, Lord Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury as follows: "I have formerly delivered it as
my opinion on another occasion, and I still continue of the same mind, that ajury have it in
their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not
only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to
deter from any such proceeding for the future and as a proof of the detestation of the jury
to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft I, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (1763).
The jury awarded the plaintiff a thousand pounds damages. However, a judge's charge
which contained language justifying an award as "a proof of the detestation of the jury to
the action itself" was reversed in Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 382 (1866). The
court, nonetheless, sustained the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages. See also Lake
Shore & M. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893).
15 2 Wils. K.B. at 205,95 Eng. Rep. at 768. There were in effect fifteen other verdicts which
depended on the decision of the court in Huckle v. Money.
16 "[I]t is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in damages for torts; it must be a
glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a tort, and which all mankind at first blush
must think so, to induce a court to grant a new trial for excessive damages." Id. at 207, 95
Eng. Rep. at 769.
17 Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (C.P. 1764). The jury
awarded damages-principally punitive-exemplary-in the amount of £ 1000.
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the court announced the conditions necessary for setting aside a jury's
award: "the damages must be monstrous and enormous indeed, and such as
all mankind must be ready to exclaim against, at first blush."18 With such
vast latitude, however, the restriction on the jury's freedom of action was
probably more theoretical than practical.
When the court did not require the jury to confine itself to its "oath to
consider the mere personal injury only," it permitted the invasion of the
law of torts by concepts commonly associated with criminal proceedings,
but not restrained by the traditional safeguards. When the court did not
upset an award fifteen times larger than that deemed "sufficient," it sanc-
tioned a novel, free-wheeling doctrine. The explanation must be found in the
bitter struggle of the individual against the oppressive measures of George
III and his ministers. 19 Men were battling fiercely to protect their liberty,
their privacy, freedom of the press, and freedom from unrestricted search
and seizure. The judges who were deeply committed to the supremacy of
these principles allowed their strong personal political views to penetrate
their judicial decisions. 20
Certain points are worth noting about these early cases. First, they ex-
pressly recognized the distinction between compensatory damages ("dam-
ages sufficient" or damages which are "a satisfaction to the injured per-
son") and damages awarded specifically as punishment and as deterrent.
Secondly, the award of punitive-exemplary damages was predicated on the
invasion of primary "constitutional" rights 21 and not upon malice. In
Huckle v. Money, there was no malice in the act of arrest. Indeed, it was
effected in the course of defendant's official duty. Moreover, the plainiiff
was in custody for about six hours and during that time he was "treated...
well." 2 2 Originally the infamy of the act itself was the determinant in the
1 Id. at 250, 95 Eng. Rep. at 794. The verdict was justified by the court on the ground
that it was an "extraordinary case which concerns the liberty of every one of the King's
subjects." Sedgwick, however, suggests that the refusal of the court to set aside the jury's
verdict resulted from "the lack of the power to do so." I SEDGWIcK 69. It is interesting to
note that prior to making the statement quoted in the text, the court said: "There is not one
single case (that is law) in all the books to be found, where the court has granted a new trial
for excessive damages in actions for torts." 2 Wils. K.B. at 249, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793. Ex-
tremely large awards were not uncommon and were upheld. See Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 519
(1957).
19 Lord Camden and Chatham, the Elder Pitt, were among the leading libertarians in the
House of Lords. One of Lord Camden's earliest cases, as a member of the bar, involved his
defense of a defendant accused of publishing a libel. He boldly insisted on the jury's right
to judge both the law and the fact, an insistence which to the end of his life he strenuously
and at last successfully maintained. 8 Foss, JUDGEs OF ENGLAND 358 (1864).20 The arguments in the House of Lords between Lord Mansfield and Lord Chief Justice
Pratt, among others, with respect to judicial decisions in which one or the other participated,
reflected a lack of sensitivity and detachment which we have grown to expect from courts.
See 3 CAMPBELL, LivEs OF THE CHIEF JusTicEs 368-459 (1874).
211 SEDGWICK 743.
22 Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763).
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award of punitive-exemplary damages. In time, however, a shift in emphasis
occurred. The defendant's malice, wantonness, or conscious indifference to
harmful consequences-whatever those grab-bag, question-begging epithets
may mean-have become the indispensable conditions for an award beyond
"damages sufficient." 23 The key question posed by this historical develop-
ment is whether a concept generated by the struggle between an oppressive
ruler and his subjects is appropriate in the clash of day-to-day living be-
tween individuals in a free and highly complex society; should tort liability
based on personal motives and intentions be sanctioned in our turbulent,
dynamic society ?24
Thdse who have canonized the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages
as dogma-and they are in the great majority-do so in great part because it
has the weight of authority. 25 They also contend that the quantum and
severity of admonition or deterrence inherent in compensatory damages are
insufficient to assure a stable, secure, and law-abiding society. 26 Damages
must be supplemented when the defendant's conduct is malicious or wan-
ton.27 To buttress their position, the supporters of the doctrine cite those
23 The Restatement of Torts permits the award of punitive damages "to punish ... for
... outrageous conduct." §908 (1939). The subsequent explanation defines "outrageous
conduct" as conduct involving "acts done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference
to the interests of others." § 908, comment b at 555 (1939). Punitive-exemplary damages
were awarded in a case of trespass to land when the defendant's conduct was such as to dis-
regard "every principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen .... " Merest v. Harvey,
5 Taunt. 442, 443, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814). Such damages are justified in part as
serving the function of revenge. Note, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 517, 525 (1957). It is difficult to
justify any role for revenge in civil proceedings.
24 "[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any
other at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to
find that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the par-
ticular person's motives or intentions." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). "It remains to
be proved that, while the terminology of morals is still retained, and while the law does still
and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless, by
the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting these moral standards into exter-
nal or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly elimi-
nated." Id. at 38. "[Any amount of malevolence on the defendant's part in and of itself
would not enhance the amount the plaintiff recovered by a penny, and ... absolute good
will would not cut it down." Per Holmes, J., in Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154
Mass. 238, 245, 28 N.E. 1, 5 (1891).
25 See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851): "We are aware that the
propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial deci-
sions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the
question will not admit of argument." See also Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Il. 192, 197, 131
N.E. 675, 677 (1921).
26 "It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult by
exemplary damage." Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442, 444, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814),
cited in Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 364-65 (1873). "All damages are in some degree punitive
and preventive, but they are not so called unless they exceed just compensation .... " RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 342, comment a at 561 (1932). See PROSSER, TORTS 28 (1941).
27 Although it is generally recognized that the award of damages is essential to avoid the
evil of private retribution, the controversy ranges on the quantum of damages. The sup-
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situations where the actual damages may be small but the need for admoni-
tion great, as when a man wantonly shoots into a crowd but actually injures
no one. A prophylactic end is also served in those cases where one may find
it economically advantageous to commit a wrong even though obliged to
compensate the innocent plaintiff for the damage done. 28 As a subsidiary
ground, it is urged that since an injured plaintiff may not recover all his
legal expenses, a "malicious" wrongdoer should not be permitted with im-
punity to impose such a burden on an innocent plaintiff.29 It is also urged
that a plaintiff might not bring suit unless he could claim punitive-exemplary
damages as well.30 However, it is principally for the punitive and deterrent
effects that the doctrine is supported as a sound, serviceable legal tool."
Despite the repeated ritualistic invocation of the term "deterrence," there
is little reliable evidence to establish that punitive-exemplary damages do, in
fact, deter.32 For example, nothing has been adduced to establish that the
extent of wilful tortious conduct is greater in Massachusetts, which has re-
jected the doctrine, than in New York which has adopted it. It has been
generally assumed that such damages are necessary to deter. Yet, one of the
least well-charted areas in our modem society is the relationship of punish-
ment to deterrence. Is deterrence myth or reality? Although the subject has
occupied the concentrated thought of scholars, psychologists, and penolo-
gists for many years, 33 it is still the subject of intense controversy and par-
porters of the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages contend that such damages are neces-
sary to prevent the evil. The opponents believe that compensatory damages are adequate to
serve that principle. "If people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the
law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid
the greater evil of private retribution." HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 41-42 (1881). But he
rejected the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages. See note 5 supra. "A civil court in
matters of civil injury is a bad corrector of morals; it has only to do with the rights of par-
ties." Baillie v. Bryson, I Mur. 317, 337 (1818).
28 See Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 70 AtI. 953 (1908).
29 MCCORMICK 277.
30 Cf. Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 700, 123 So. 861, 863 (1929): "Punitive
damages are.., awarded to the injured party as a reward for his public service in bringing
the wrong-doer to account." But see Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 57 (1878).
31 "mhe purposes of exemplary damages are to punish for a past event and to preventfuture offenses .... 4 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 908, Comment e at 557 (1939). See also
PROSSER, TORTS 11 (1941).
32 To demonstrate statistically the efficacy of punitive-exemplary damages as a deterrent
may be as difficult as to demonstrate statistically the efficacy of prayer.
33 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SELEcT COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1930); ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, CMD. No. 8932 (1953). The latter concluded
that peculiar social and economic conditions rather than punishment conditioned the rate
of crime. See KOEsTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 176 (1956). A recent report of the Brit-
ish Home Office suggests that a deterrent penalty is a much less important factor in
murders than many others. 1961 ECONOMIST 326 "I think scientifically the claim of deter-
rence [in murder] is not worth much.... ." FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 81 (1956).
After four years of research, a traffic research authority concluded that "no amount of
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tisanship. Without entering this controversy, the following observations
may be safely made. Some degree of deterrence is probably inherent in com-
pensatory damages.34 The quantum, however, is uncertain. What is even
more uncertain is the extent of additional deterrence which is socially neces-
sary or desirable and the amount of punitive-exemplary damages necessary
to insure that additional deterrence. Thus, three layers of unknown variable
quantities underlie the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages. When one
notes that these uncertainties are overlaid by the shifting feelings and senti-
ments of jurors, one may well be skeptical of the results flowing from the
doctrine.35
Although damages are not ordinarily susceptible to mechanical measure-
ment, experience, common sense, and external tests are helpful. Such tools,
however, are of little avail in fixing punitive-exemplary damages. The prin-
ciple-sufficient to deter but not to oppress-is too shadowy a measure to
effect a rational determination of punitive-exemplary damages. 3 6 The
amount may vary from time to time and from place to place. It may depend
upon such factors as the mores of the community, different rules of evi-
dence, and the sympathy or distaste for the defendant. 37 Jurors in a com-
admonishment, no amount of punishment, no type of social censure is an effective deterrent
to drunken drivers." Dr. James L. Malfetti, quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 37, col. 2.
Difficult as it is to trace the relationship between punishment and deterrence in criminal
proceedings, the difficulty is compounded in civil proceedings. Whether a particular state
decrees capital punishment for a premeditated murder is fairly common knowledge among
the residents of that state. But whether a particular state sanctions punitive-exemplary dam-
ages is probably known to few outside the legal profession in that state. For effective deter-
rence-assuming a nexus between punishment and deterrence-prior awareness of the law
is desirable, albeit not always, sufficient. Ignorance of the law, however, may negate deter-
rence.
34 RESTATEMENT, CoNrrRAcrs § 342, Comment a at 561 (1932).
35 The tendency of the law "must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty." HoLMEs,
THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
36 "[E]xemplary damages rest upon such vague and unmeasurable bases .... Luther v.
Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 237, 147 N.E. 18, 19 (1914). In International Union, UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958), the trial judge charged: "you are authorized to fix such punitive dam-
ages as may seem right to you, not exceeding the amount claimed in the complaint." Record,
p. 634. Even McCormick, who accepts the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages, believes
that there should be some control-some external standard-in the award of such damages.
MCCORMICK 298. "ITIhe dangers of measuring punishment in a civil court are greater than
the gains ...." Morris, supra note 2, at 1178. But cf. Note, 70 HARV. .L. REv. 517, 531
(1957).
37 Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 57 (1878). The history of fixing damages in cases of
fraud and gross negligence in Roman law is of interest here. In those cases, the "plaintiff
•.. was permitted himself to swear to the amount of injury sustained; and there seems orig-
inally to have been no check oh this prerogative .... [B]ut this license was restrained by
positive provisions, which gave the power of assessment to the judex. To check still more
effectually the abuses ... various statutory provisions were introduced, and an effort was
made to obviate the difficulty by fixed valuations not to be departed from." I SEDGWICK 17.
The element of caprice and untrustworthiness in damage awards is an age-old problem.
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munity hostile to certain minority groups, to unions, to "outsiders," or to a
particular class may award specially large damages against members of such
groups. At best, such awards generally are haphazard. That such awards
may reflect excesses and injustice rather than reasonable admonition should,
therefore, not be surprising.
"Anomalous" 38 as this doctrine is, it has spawned further anomalies by
an almost ineluctable process. While an innocent injured plaintiff may claim
compensation as a legal right, he has no such right to punitive-exemplary
damages, however extreme the defendant's conduct and however meritori-
ous the plaintiff's case. The option is entirely the jury's to award or not to
award such damages-to open or not to open Pandora's box. The jury may
find overwhelming evidence of wantonness, malice or indifference to conse-
quences; yet it may without any reason refuse to award punitive-exemplary
damages. 39 No judge may deprive a jury of that right.40 This absolute, le-
gally unfettered discretion vested in a jury-tantamount to legally sanc-
tioned anarchy-is rare in our civil procedure.
This condition evidences the invasion of tort litigation by ideas under-
lying the criminal law4l but without the traditional safeguards of criminal
procedure.4 2 Punishment and deterrence are the alleged moving forces in
both types of proceedings. Although a jury of twelve men may be trusted as
well as a judge to find facts, motive and intent,4 3 it is the judge in criminal
law who is generally designated to measure the punishment. He is assumed
38 McCoRIicK 291; Morris, supra note 2, at 1176.
39 1 SEDGWICK 753; Harrison v. Ely, 120 Ill. 83, 11 N.E. 334 (1887); Bergmann v. Jones,
94 N.Y. 51 (1883); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29, 89 S.E. 802 (1916).
40 "mhe trier of fact is not required to award punitive damages in a case where they are
permissible and it is error for a trial judge to instruct the jury that punitive damages must be
given." 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 908, Comment d at 556 (1939). See also McCoRMICK 296.
41 The Supreme Court of the United States recognized that punitive-exemplary damages
are "penal in [their] nature" to an extent. International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634 (1958). See also Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 I1. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 678 (1921).
42 "Let the criminal law deal with the criminal, and administer punishment for the legiti-
mate purpose and end of punishment-namely, the reformation of the offender and the
safety of the people. Let the individual, whose rights are infringed and who has suffered
injury, go to the civil courts and there obtain full and ample reparation and compensation;
but let him not thus obtain the 'fruits' to which he is not entitled, and which belong to
others." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873). It is an understatement to call the distinc-
tion between punitive and compensatory damages "a modem refinement" as Mr. Justice
Stone did in Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927). Occasionally, the controversy on
punitive-exemplary damages has been described as one of "terminology of the law, rather
than as to the extent of the right of recovery or the real measure of damages." Hendrickson
v. Kingsbury 21 Iowa 379, 387 (1866). Accord, Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed. 912 (D. Nev.),
aff'd., 109 U.S. 180 (1883). But this distinction was recognized as early as Huckle v. Money,
2 Wils. K. B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
4 3 FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 82 (1930).
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to be better equipped by training, experience and objectivity.44 Further-
more, as additional protection to the defendant, the judge's discretion is con-
trolled by, and contained within, fixed bounds set by the legislature, pre-
sumably after careful study of the social needs of the community. In the
punitive-exemplary damage proceeding, it is the jury who decides, without
the benefit of a prior legislative determination, whether punitive-exemplary
damages should or should not be awarded and in what amount. Twelve men,
deliberating secretly, have the vast power of fixing dollar punishment 45
which in criminal law is left to legislatures and judges. Consequently, each
new suit becomes a case of first impression for legislating punishment by
each jury.46 Unlike the legislative bodies which have the benefit of a mass of
relevant material and experts in fixing punishment, an ad hoc jury has little
more than its feelings and sentiments to guide them. Thus, the doctrine
decreeing punishment evades basic safeguards of criminal procedure. Such
rough and chaotic justice can be justified, if at all, only by an overriding
necessity and outstanding effectiveness. The necessity is problematical; the
effectiveness is dubious.
It is urged that a judge can, by his charge to the jury, effectively check a
jury's prejudice or abuses. That is expecting too much. The charge generally
tends to be an arid abstract proposition of law. Its objectivity-however
profuse-rarely illuminates or guides juries.47 As between an abstract propo-
sition of law couched in conventional text book legal terms and an immedi-
ate deep-seated emotional drive, there can be little doubt which will prevail.
Individual or local prejudice will not be distracted by an intellectual dis-
course on abstract legal principles. Crass partisanship can defeat justice and
still not be within the cognizance of a judge. The judge cannot give the jury
any practicable criterion beyond suggesting that it is for the jury to deter-
mine what will be sufficient to punish the defendant and to deter others.
That task would be exceedingly onerous and challenging for an outstand-
ingly equipped judge. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in another context: "To
44 "But a judge has wider experience with wrongdoers and is familiar with the normal
scope and size of awards. The flexibility which exemplary damages bring to the admonitory
function of tort law can better be achieved by the judge than by the jury." Note, 70 HARV.
L. RE,. 517, 530 (1957). But even judges have been criticized for the erratic character of their
sentences for comparable crimes. So serious is the situation that the United States Attorney
General felt it necessary to point out that inconsistent sentences are "inflaming" rather than
"healing" the underlying social "cancer" that leads to organized crime. N.Y. Times, Oct.
13, 1961, p. 21.
45 See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
46 Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878). The plaintiff's complaint sets the limits of dam-
ages. This is a modified throwback to early Roman law when the plaintiff himself was per-
mitted to swear to the amount of injury sustained. See note 37 supra.
47 FRANKFURTER, op. cit. supra note 43, at 83. The judge's charge on punitive-
exemplary damages in the Russell case, running to about a thousand words, was so general
that it might have been taken baldly from a treatise on damages. Record, pp. 631-33.
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measure them justly needs not only the highest powers of a judge and a
training which the practice of the law does not insure, but also a freedom
from prepossessions which is very hard to attain." 48 Yet the doctrine ex-
pects such "powers" and "training" and "freedom from prepossession"
from an ad hoc jury of twelve men.
It is also urged that a court may reverse a jury's award when, in its opin-
ion, it is excessive. 49 Although judges have not, gone so far as Lord Chief
Justice Pratt, who would reverse only if the damages were so "monstrous
and enormous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim
against, at first blush,"50 still reversals are rare.5 1 More often than not, jury
awards of such damages are deemed oracles and sacrosanct, and are rarely
modified.
Further, it has been suggested that a plaintiff might not bring suit unless
he could claim punitive-exemplary damages also.52 But stability in social
and economic relations should not require the encouragement of private
litigation or private prosecutors.53 If a public prosecutor does not choose to
4 8 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 129 (1920). See also COHEN, REASON AND NATURE,
420,421 (1921), where he wrote: "The obvious fact which no glorification oflaw can obscure
is that it is made by human beings subject to the limitation of human ignorance and of
inadequate sympathy or good will .... History does not show that the partisan bias of
limited group experience can always be removed by legal training or by the criticism of the
legal profession."
49 "The danger... of immoderate verdicts, is certainly a real one, and the criterion to be
applied by the judge in setting aside or reducing the amount is concededly a vague and sub-jective one." McCoRmicK 278.
50 See note 17 supra.
51 See Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 237, 147 N.W. 18, 19 (1914). On the issue of the
character of jury awards of punitive-exemplary damages, statements by text writers cover a
wide spectrum. On the one hand: "The reported cases offer many interesting instances of
startlingly large verdicts for punitive damages, and the function of judicial review of thejury's 'rough justice,' as meted out under its punitive power, must in general be one of con-
siderable difficulty." MCCORmICK 278. But he says that unjustifiable awards rarely "escape
correction." Ibid. "The amount of damages which may be assessed in a proper case under
the head of exemplary damages is in a measure arbitrary. The jufy may do what they please,
and their verdict is subject to revision only in case of a palpable miscarriage of justice."
1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 488 (1906). A verdict which barely exceeded the
actual damages was reversed. Mitchell v. Randall, 288 Pa. 518, 137 Atl. 171 (1927). A verdict
which was many times the actual damages was sustained. Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug
Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095 (1911). That such an anarchical doctrine should yield
disharmony is inevitable.
52 Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 525, 526 (1957).
53 "Perhaps, the principal advantage [of punitive-exemplary damages] is that it does tend
to bring to punishment a type of cases of oppressive conduct, such as slanders, assaults,
minor oppressions, and cruelties, which are theoretically criminally punishable, but which
in actual practice go unnoticed by prosecutors occupied with more serious crimes." Mc-
CORMICK 276. "If an act is particularly wrongful, society imposes criminal sanctions in
order to deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the offense. But while some faults,
such as ordinary negligence, should be discouraged, they do not warrant the stigma and
severity of criminal punishment." Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 523 (1957). The difficulty
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proceed by criminal process in a particular situation, either because it is too
trivial or because he is occupied with more serious crimes, his decision,
rather than that of a private plaintiff might well prevail. If a conscientious
and dedicated prosecutor thinks that the threat to the well being of the
community from particular conduct is too slight to warrant protective
criminal action, his decision should not be negated or overruled by a pri-
vate plaintiff whose decision may be determined primarily by zeal for per-
sonal gain rather than protection of society. At all events, the burden of
establishing the social utility of private prosecution must be borne by the
supporterg of the doctrine. This burden has not been discharged.
This aspect of the problem would not merit such attention if it had not
been suggested that,
Although in practice it may not always be possible to avoid excessive
punishment, the risk of such punishment is outweighed [sic] by the likeli-
hood that the reluctance of prosecutors to press charges for minor offenses
would allow some wrongdoers to escape adequate punishment if ex-
emplary damages were abolished. 54
There is no sound reason to suppose that the only choices are either no
punishment or excessive punishment for minor offenses. If, however, these
were the only choices-and they are not, as we shall see later-much could be
said for permitting minor offenses to go unpunished rather than risking exces-
sive punishment whether in many or few cases. Such a choice would appear to
be more'consonant with traditional concepts of justice than the converse.
Minor offenses scarcely necessitate a slavish adherence to a doctrine which
stemmed from the deprivation of an individual's revered rights. There is no
need to use a tank to crush a mouse.
Furthermore, the doctrine "seems to be the only practice (apart from the
double and triple damage statute cases)" in which jury awards result in "an
out and out windfall to the plaintiff." 55 Even under those multiple damage
statutes, before damages may be doubled or tripled, actual base damages must
be initially ascertained.5 6 Such base damages are compensatory and are
founded on a record susceptible to evaluation and not on undisclosed feelings
and sentiments. Moreover, the punitive damages are defined and limited. Con-
with this position is that even though "ordinary negligence should be discouraged," it should
not be the basis for punitive-exemplary damages. If the wrong is more serious than ordinary
negligence, and if no criminal prosecution is warranted, why give a jury this practically un-
controlled latitude of fixing punishment?
54 Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 525 (1957).
55 Morris, supra note 2, at 1177 n.7. The statutory device of double or triple damages
is used in nearly every state. It has a history of many centuries. See Note, 70 HARv. L. R~v.
517, 518 (1957).
56 Occasionally the actual damage sustained by plaintiff may be greater than he can estab-
lish in court. In such cases, the additional damages make up for that inability. Mithey v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 694, 702 (D. Mass. 1944).
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sequently, the opportunity for caprice and prejudice in those situations is ma-
terially circumscribed. In the absence of those statutes which legislatures
deemed of special public interest, it is difficult to understand why instituting
an action should warrant a windfall. In those circumstances, compensating a
plaintiff fully should be adequate. It is questionable whether the public interest
requires further rewards.57
It is urged that a special class of cases require remedial action beyond purely
compensatory damages. They include cases in which the loss to the plaintiff is
small but the wrong particularly offensive. In another group of cases, a de-
fendant may find it more profitable to commit and pay for the wrong. 58 True,
the compensatory damages in those cases may be too slight to warrant the
expense of instituting an action or ineffective to prevent a repetition of the
wrong. Here, as in the case of the minor offenses referred to above, a solution
is provided by the so-called Connecticut rule.5 9 According to that rule, if the
elements indispensable for the award of punitive-exemplary damages are pres-
ent, the defendant is taxed with all the legal expenses of the injured plaintiff
over and above taxable costs. This rule would have a double virtue; it would
punish wanton wrong doing while restricting the area of caprice and prejudice
open to juries. It would serve to bring a rough, potent legal tool within con-
trolled bounds. If punishment, indeed, deters, then the imposition of such ad-
ditional burden on the wanton wrongdoer would not be without utility.
Moreover, if the offense be minor, such additional burden on the defendant
would in all likelihood provide adequate punishment. Litigation would not
be encouraged for the sake of windfalls, confusion would be restricted, and a
semblance of coherence would be attained. A measure of relief would be avail-
able in those cases in which the plaintiff's loss is slight but which require remedi-
al legal action beyond what is now afforded in ordinary tort actions. It would
57 "The manifest iniquity of awarding plaintiff something to which he is not entitled."
Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541,550-51, 5 Pac. 119, 125 (1884). Punitive-exemplary damages
have been "condemned as undue compensation of the plaintiff beyond his just desserts in the
form of a criminal fine which should be paid to the state if anyone .. " See PROSSER,
TORTS 13 (1941).
A contrary view is justified as follows: "Awarding exemplary damages to the state might
permit the jury to take a more objective view of the defendant's motives and conduct,
divorced from sympathy or distaste for the plaintiff. However, the subsidiary functions of
exemplary damages-compensation and revenge-seem to justify making the award to the
plaintiff even though it may be largely a windfall." Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 525 (1957).
Anti-trust cases may be cited as an example of private individuals supplementing the activi-
ties of public prosecutors. But such cases are not ordinarily minor. And, more importantly,
such litigation has been expressly declared to be so much in the public interest that a specific
and limited reward is fixed for successful prosecution.
58 See note 28 supra.
59 Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 Atl. 640 (1917); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111
Conn. 575, 578, 150 At. 692, 693 (1930). "Much may be said for the practical common
sense of this restriction .... " McCoRMicK 297. Connecticut has a statute authorizing
double damages in accident cases involving violations of certain traffic laws. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 14-295 (1958).
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also satisfy the emotional drive of those plaintiffs who do not choose to depend
on a public prosecutor or police force to bring a defendant to book without
exposing such defendant to excessive punishment or unbridled caprice.
II.
The second of the two questions posed at the outset of this paper must now
be examined: does the doctrine have any legitimate place in litigation involving
labor relations? An answer is facilitated by noting the existing exceptions to
the enforcement of the doctrine. According to the Restatement of Contracts,
"punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract." 60 A leading
authority expresses the rationale of this conclusion as follows:
The denial of such recovery in cases of contract probably flows first from
a desire to restrict the field of exemplary damages, the allowance of which is
usually regarded as an anomaly, and, second, from a belief that, since the
vast majority of breaches of contract are due to inability or to erroneous
beliefs as to the scope of the obligation, it is doubtful wisdom to add to the
risks imposed on entering into a contract this liability to an acrimonious
contest over whether a breach was malicious or fraudulent and the danger of
a large and undefined recovery of punitive damages. 61
If it is doubtful wisdom to expose parties to a contract to "the danger of a
large and undefined recovery of punitive damages," it would seem even more
doubtful wisdom to do so in the case of an employer and his workers and their
representatives. A commercial contract does not ordinarily have the quality of
continuity and personal relationship present in a labor-management situation.
It has been said that "the general purpose underlying the law of damages,
whether they are given for a breach of contract or for a tort, is to promote
security and to prevent disorder." 62 Yet, if the attainment of those ends does
60 § 342, at 561 (1932).
61
"McCoRMICK 291. One court refused to award punitive-exemplary damages for the
defendant's breach of contract to pay a money debt, even though this defendant sought to
embarrass the plaintiff financially and to affect its credit standing. J. J. White, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, Inc., 48 Del. 526, 107 A.2d 892, (1954). See also 5 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1077 (Supp. 1961, at 48). Cf. Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 532 (1957): "Since
a malicious breach of contract may be as wrongful and deserving of punishment as an inten-
tional tort, allowing exemplary damages would have the socially desirable effect of discour-
aging such breaches of contract." The author of the Note supports the award of punitive-
exemplary damages in such cases on the ground that injury to the plaintiff may exceed the
recoveries under the usual contract theories of damages. That view might be defensible if
punitive-exemplary damages were limited (in that case) to an amount necessary to com-
pensate. But the function of punitive-exemplary damages is not so limited.
62 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 366 (1951). Occasionally, punitive-exemplary damages are
awarded in cases where the breach of contract duties is also a tort. See Prosser, The Border-
land of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED ToPics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380,402,420 (1953).
"The damages that are called punitive in breach of promise cases can generally be properly
regarded as compensatory. They are given as compensation for kinds of harm that cannot
easily be estimated in terms of money." 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 369. See also Luther v. Shaw,
157 Wis. 231, 147 N.W. 17 (1914); Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 531 n.103.
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not require the award of punitive-exemplary damages for breach of contract,
one may ask why they are required in tort actions. This question is even more
pertinent when one notes that the law of torts goes beyond that of contracts in
carving out exceptions-exceptions even in the area of compensatory dam-
ages. A distinguished authority in the field of torts expressed this rationale as
follows: "Mhe primary conception of the obligation in torts is to refrain from
injurious action, unless the doing of the act, even with its attendant risk, is so
beneficial to the public generally, the object of it so valuable to the general
welfare, that even private injury must be borne to encourage it."63
In the service of valuable public welfare, one is privileged knowingly to in-
fict temporal damage.64 Since, in such a situation, compensatory damages are
denied, punitive-exemplary damages are also barred.
The sturdy, indeed phenomenal, growth of our modern economic system
has occurred in a climate characterized by the struggle between management
and labor. Some harm is an unavoidable by-product of such conflict and the
loss is allowed to lie where it falls.65 "[E]conomic loss inevitably attends work
stoppages." 66 Indeed, the pervasiveness of this struggle coupled with the vital
need for stability in labor-management relations necessitated intervention by
the Congress in balancing the competing claims of management and labor.
Congress has chosen to subordinate its concern with an employer's economic
loss to the protection of workers' rights to bargain collectively and to strike.
Fearful of chaos, Congress has set up an elaborate regulative scheme watched
over by a special administrative agency. Rights, duties, privileges, prohibitions
and procedures were spelled out in considerable detail. By these measures,
Congress sought in an orderly fashion to limit the impact of the struggle, to
expedite the disposition of labor disputes, and to insure uniformity of results. 67
The necessity of federal legislation is dramatically evidenced by the Russell
case. A strike was called. The union involved was one of the leading respon-
sible labor organizations in this country. One may reasonably assume that the
strike, in the opinion of the union, was called in the best interests of its mem-
bers.
63 BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 62 (1926).
64 The existence of the privilege and how far it shall be allowed are matters of legislative
policy. See HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 119 (1920).
65 This was recognized by Congress when it passed the Clayton Act, in answer to those
who sought to make labor unions subject to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
38 Stat. 730 (1914) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (1958). In a strike, immunity is won by its purpose.
See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 25 (1930).
66 International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 649 (Chief Justice Warren, dis-
senting).
67 
"The Federal Act represents an attempt to balance the competing interest of employee,
union and management," said Chief Justice Warren dissenting in Russell. Id. at 650. "[ln
the eye of the law [that price is] thought sufficient to justify the harm .... " Exchange
Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 263, 157 N.E. 130, 132 (1927) (per
Andrews, J.).
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The strikers sought to make their strike effective by attracting as many ad-
herents to their point of view as possible and keeping as many non-strikers as
possible away from the plant. If enough workers returned to permit uninter-
rupted production, the strike might fail. Had the strikers limited themselves to
peaceful persuasion, and had the non-strikers stayed away from the plant, or
had the employer shut down the plant, then no worker could have recovered
damages for loss of wages. Neither could the employer have recovered any-
thing, even though it could demonstrate economic loss as a result of the
strike.68 But the jury found evidence of intimidation and threats of violence on
the part of some strikers against some non-strikers. 69 Such threats, being
unlawful, gave rise to legal liability. They annulled the privilege to cause tem-
poral damage to non-strikers.
Russell, a non-striker seeking to return to work, was deprived of the privi-
lege of working for five weeks. He lost $500 in wages. He was entitled to be
made whole, that is, to recover the wages which he lost, but he was awarded
$10,000:70 compensation five per cent; punishment and deterrence ninety-five
per cent. Thus, he received a "windfall" of $9,500, the equivalent of almost
two years' wages. Despite the defendants' objections, the Alabama Supreme
Court justified the award in the light of "the necessity of preventing similar
wrongs... [as] we must do. . ."71 Yet other legal tools-more appropriate
and swifter-were readily available to prevent similar wrongs without op-
pressing defendants or unjustly enriching plaintiffs. The majority of the United
States Supreme Court sustained the Alabama court's holding without more
than "punitive damages constitute a well-settled form of relief under the law of
Alabama when there is a willful and malicious wrong." 72 Chief Justice Warren,
in his dissenting opinion, argued that the award of damages in a state court frus-
trated the policies of Congressional legislation and had "an unfavorable effect
upon the uniformity the Act sought to achieve." He added:
By approving a state-court damage award for conduct regulated by the
Taft-Hartley Act, the majority assures that the consequences of violating
68 It is assumed-and there is no evidence to indicate the contrary-that the strike was
not in violation of a contractual obligation.
69 Apparently there was no evidence of any personal injury.-
70 356 U.S. at 652 n.10.
71 264 Ala. 456, 473, 88 So. 2d 175, 189 (1956). Yet an employee who is wrongfully dis-
charged is "entitled [only] to the full wages promised less what he can earn in similar service
by reasonable effort after his discharge." 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 167 (1951).
An employee who was wrongfully discharged was disallowed punitive-exemplary damages.
Holland v. Spartanburg Herald Journal Co., 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203 (1932). "[A]cts of
willfulness will support punitive damages in tort cases... but will not in suits arising ex
contractu. ... and especially in breach of contract cases, although in such cases the volun-
tary breach is of necessity an act of volition ... " Id. at 469, 165 S.E. at 208. Corbin sug-
gests that a larger compensatory award might be sustained. 5 CORBIN, CONTRAcrS § 118
(1951).
72 356 U.S. at 646.
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the Federal Act will vary from State to State with the availability and
constituent elements of a given right of action and the procedures and
rules of evidence essential to its vindication. The matter of punitive dam-
ages is an example, though by no means the only one.73
We are not here dealing with the respective roles of state and federal juris-
diction or the virtues of uniformity. Neither are we evaluating the role of trade
unions in our society. We are concerned for the moment only with the legiti-
macy of the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages in a tense, feverishly dis-
turbed labor-management situation. This demands awareness of and obeisance
to the complexity of human motives and the clash of interests in a strike. On
one side are workers struggling to protect their jobs and improve their stand-
ards. On the other is the employer who seeks to keep costs down and to main-
tain or improve his competitive position. Also, there are the non-strikers whose
paramount concern is the possible loss of wages. Thus, there are three parties
intimately and directly involved, participating, and clashing-in one form or
another-in a strike.
A strike presents the mystery of human dilemmas. The non-striker must
choose between losing his wages or returning to work. Should he choose to
return he must know that his conduct may impede the objectives of the
strikers. He is unlike the innocent and passive bystander in the crowd into
which a wanton wrongdoer shoots. By his affirmative choice to return to
work, he, in effect, sides with the employer and, psychologically speaking, pro-
vokes the strikers. The privilege or liberty to return to work remains unim-
paired,7 4 but provocation is a natural result of his conduct. Scabbing to a
striker is as much a provocation as the proverbial red flag to the bull.
That strikers will respond to the hostile action of the non-strikers is natural,
reasonable, and inevitable. What is uncertain is the nature of the response.
Here the strikers too face a dilemma. Will their response be limited to a re-
luctant passive acceptance of the non-strikers' return to work which may de-
feat the strike? If peaceful persuasion be not effective, will the urge to make the
strike succeed become so obsessive as to cause strikers to resort to minatory
tactics? Dilemmas in a strike are not always met with detachment and reason,
despite any instructions from top union leadership to exercise restraint.
In a strike, it is not uncommon for tempers to flare and emotions to rise to
frenetic heights. It is the rare judge who sees that "men become earnest and
excited and vigorous at such times.... The fervor of argument is upon them.
... They forget etiquette and grammar; ... instigated by... deep convic-
73 356 U.S. at 650-51. In a recent decision, it was held (three judges dissenting) that the
Taft-Hartley Law does not provide for punitive-exemplary damages for collective bargain-
ing contract violations. United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., Wall St.
Journal, p. 5, Jan. 5, 1962.
74 
"No one should forget that to have a right is not the same thing as having a right to
insist on that right." Lewis, Legal and Moral Responsibility, THE LIrENEM 645 (1961).
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tion men always employ strong words-the nomenclature of the strike is not
the language of the parlor. ' 75
Apparently the trial judge in the Russell case was not one of those "rare
judges" who are aware of the bitterness, the partisanship, and the passions of
a labor controversy. Presumably forgetting that parties in a strike are some-
thing less than saints, he instructed the jury that if "the defendant was actuated
by malice and actuated by ill-will, committed the unlawful and wrongful acts
alleged, you, in addition to the actual damages, if any, may give damages, for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant for the purpose of
making the defendant smart... . "76 It transcends human nature and conducl
for strikers to be actuated by anything other than "ill-will" against a non-
striker seeking to return to work and thereby imperiling the hopes of the
strikers. To expect any other emotion from strikers is to expect a miracle. The
very atmosphere of a strike seethes with strife and ill will-striker pitted
against non-striker, striker against employer, and employer against striker.
Yet not a word of this drama was included in the judge's charge. Instead, he
charged the jury that malice could "be implied from the intentional doing of
the wrongful act." 77 He sanctioned this implication despite the grave doubts
that the acts of the strikers were committed out of pure malice and spite.78 The
contrary implication may be more reasonable. The action of a striker, passion-
ately and sincerely determined to elevate his standards and to prevent a non-
striker from returning to work, is generally a far cry from ordinary wanton
conduct. It may be unlawful, but it is neither necessarily nor implicitly wanton,
malicious, or spiteful. Indeed, in many cases, the strikers may be animated not
exclusively by personal interest but also by the urge to help all the workers in
the plant, including the non-strikers. That the latter disagree or do not wel-
come such offer of help does not negate these motives of the strikers. 79 In any
event, the issue is not so simple or plain that it warrants without more a
75 Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 189, 186 N.Y. Supp.
95, 98 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
76 Record, p. 631. (Emphasis added.) When the term malice is used, it is meant to signify
"that the harm is wished for its own sake, or, as Austin would say with more accuracy, for
the sake of the pleasurable feeling which knowledge of the suffering caused by the act would
excite." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 52 (1881). "1 mean by malice, a malevolent motive for
action, without reference to any hope of a remoter benefit to oneself to be accomplished by
the intended harm to another." HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 118-19 (1920).
77 The extent of the unawareness of the trial court judge of the complex elements in a
strike is evidenced by the instruction which he gave at the plaintiff's request. "Malice may
be implied from the intentional doing of a wrongful act; and if you are reasonably satisfied
from the evidence that the defendants intentionally committed the wrongful acts charged in
the complaint then I charge you that said acts were maliciously done-and you may award
punitive damages." Record, p. 634.
78 See note 76 supra.
79 See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 263, 157 N.E. 130,
132-33 (1927).
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Euclidian conclusion that an intentional wrongful act is ipsofacto also mali-
cious. The problem is sufficiently complex to require a deep understanding of
the motives underlying the acts. Without this empathy, justice is sterile.
One further fact must be noted. Strikes generally are settled after a time and
strikers and non-strikers return to work. What kind of harmony or stability
can the employer expect from returning strikers when they are to work with
non-strikers who have cost their union and a fellow officer large punitive-
exemplary damages? This situation does not contribute to the stable, secure,
and law-abiding society which the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages is
supposedly designed to further.
It has been suggested that exceptions have been carved out of the doctrine
of punitive-exemplary damages.8 0 We come now to an exception in ordinary
tort litigation well-established in the very states which adhere to the doctrine.
When two parties scrap, the fever and ill-will not infrequently engendered by
and associated with such squabbles are overlooked for purposes of determin-
ing punitive damages. Such feelings are not ignored when one is injured sud-
denly and without provocation by a "malicious" wrongdoer.
As Sedgwick, one of the most vigorous supporters of the doctrine, stated it:
"The existence of provocation, though it may not be a defence, will prevent the
allowance of exemplary damages. ... So in an action of assault and battery
the fact that the injury was inflicted during a mutual fight will prevent the al-
lowance of exemplary damages."8 1 Certainly, strikes afford vivid examples of
"a mutual fight" between strikers and non-strikers.
Sedgwick adds that the provocation "must have been so recent that the act
can be said to have been committed under the immediate influence of feelings
excited.... And it must have been sufficient to have stirred some degree of
resentment in an ordinary man." 2
Mr. Justice Holmes' lapidary wisdom may also come to our assistance at
this point. He said: "According to current morality, a man is not so much to
blame for an act done under the disturbance of great excitement, caused by a
wrong done to himself, as when he is calm. The law is made to govern men
through their motives, and it must, therefore, take their mental constitution
into account."8 3
In the Russell case, provocation was recent; indeed, it was contemporane-
ous; feelings of resentment were stirred, as they would be "in an ordinary
80 See pp. 472-73 supra.
811 SEDGWICK 747. Huftalin v. Misner, 70 111. 55 (1873). See Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis.
282, 290 (1878).
821 SEixwic 749. See also SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 1258 (1916). Note the meticulous
phrasing in the following quotation from Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in the
Russell case: "The unprovoked infliction of personal injuries during a period of labor unrest
is neither to be expected nor to be justified, but economic loss inevitably attends work
stoppages." 356 U.S. at 649. (Emphasis added.)
83 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 61 (1881).
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man." The acts of the strikers were sparked by what they conceived to be
wrongs done to them. All the elements essential to bar punitive-exemplary
damages appear to have been present in the strike in the Russell case. Although
the strikers, in the circumstances, could not have properly pleaded provocation
as a defense to an action for compensatory damages, they would have been
entitled to allege and show provocation as a bar to the award of punitive-
exemplary damages. The jury in the Russell case was not adequately instructed
on that point.84 Had provocation been demonstrated, that alone might well
have averted an oppressive judgment on the defendants and a windfall for the
plaintiff.8 5
The vice of the doctrine is deepened when we note that twenty-nine other
suits were brought against the union for similar activities in the Russell strike.
All sought punitive-exemplary damages,8 6 aggregating approximately $1,
500,000. Some resulted in punitive-exemplary damage awards. Others were
awaiting the decision of the United States Supreme Court. The multiplicity of
suits raises the question whether punitive-exemplary damages may be awarded
to a number of plaintiffs for what is substantially the same objectionable con-
duct. Intimidation or threats of violence to each non-striker are a separate
wrong, and separate liability for compensation arises in each case. However,
since the underlying purposes of the doctrine are punishment and deterrence,
the real party in interest is the public and not each individual plaintiff. Since
the gravamen or gist of the continuing conduct complained of is, in substance,
the same, the doctrine would appear to be fully served by assessing punitive-
exemplary damages on the basis of conduct rather than on the fortuitous num-
ber of plaintiffs. Conduct may be aggravated by the number of people affected
thereby, but not necessarily in a precise mathematical fashion determined by
the number of plaintiffs. Consequently, when the trial judge in the Russell case
charged "that the amount of the [punitive-exemplary] damages should not be
84 Although the judge in his charge to the jury briefly referred in another context to the
fact that prov6cation may be of a kind "sufficient to prevent an award of exemplary dam-
ages," he did not elaborate or deal with it in a sufficiently explicit manner. Record, pp. 630,
631, 633. In the circumstances, one may doubt whether the jury gave adequate consideration
to the question of the sufficiency of such provocation to generate the particular response
from the strikers. See Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 289, 290 (1878).
85 In labor relations cases, a large award of punitive-exemplary damages soon becomes
known in labor-management circles. Thus, in the very situation in which the propriety of
applying the doctrine is most open to question, deterrence can be most effective. Indeed, it
may be so effective as to interfere with and even paralyze legitimate activities. Yet if the doc-
trine continues to be sanctioned in industrial disputes litigation, unions may have to resort
to insurance protection against such hazards and deterrence may lose its vigour. See Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); American Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935). A curious result may follow. Those who are
most likely to be deterred may protect themselves, whereas the individual entirely unaware of
the doctrine, will neither be deterred by nor insured against that hazard.
86 In Russell, each of the plaintiffs in the thirty suits sought damages of $50,000. In
two cases, awards of $10,000 were made and in a third case, the award amounted to $18,450.
356 U.S. at 657.
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diminished" because there were many other similar suits pending against the
defendants,87 he was demonstrating one of the most oppressive excrescences of
the doctrine. Even in criminal law, when a defendant has been convicted of
more than one crime, the judge has the option- of mitigating or intensifying the
punishment by ordering sentences to run concurrently or consecutively. 88 But
the jury, the sentencing agency in the Russell case, was denied the choice of
diminishing individual punitive awards when the same objectionable conduct
affected more than one person. Punitive-exemplary damages to each of
twenty-nine plaintiffs may spell harsh oppression rather than reasonable ad-
monition. Windfalls are bountifully distributed and substantially beyond the
-needs of deterrence. Excessive multiplication may defeat justice.89 When a
most powerful weapon is used in this manner, on one side of an intense social
struggle, skepticism regarding law's fair dealing is to be expected.
This result is particularly unfortunate when liability is imposed on a prin-
cipal. According to Sedgwick,
it is the better opinion that no recovery of exemplary damages can be had
against a principal for the tort of an agent or servant unless the defendant
expressly authorized the act that was performed or approved it, or was
grossly negligent in hiring the agent or servant, or in not preventing him
from committing the act.... The burden of showing authorization or ap-
proval by the principal is on the plaintiff.90
87 The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury "that the amount of the damages
awarded should not be diminished because of the fact that a number of other persons have
filed similar suits against the defendant, which suits are pending and undisposed of." The
court gave the requested charge. Record, p. 636. Punitive-exemplary damages have been
allowed to more than one plaintiff as a result of one actionable wrong. See Reutkemeier v.
Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
However, the need for reducing the amount of punitive-exemplary damages in such mul-
tiple situations was recognized in Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W. 18 (1914). The
court in that case said: "Had the learned circuit judge not cut down the verdict for exemplary
damages we would no doubt have reduced it considerably below the sum fixed by the circuitjudge. But we have the judgment of the jury and the trial judge as to what is a proper amount
for punishment, warning, and deterrence, and with some hesitation, we will allow the dam-
ages to stand as fixed by the circuit judge." Id. at 240, 147 N.W. at 20.
88 The following explanatory "comment" appears in the Restatement of Torts on the
subject of punitive damages. "The awarding of punitive damages is not prevented by a prior
criminal conviction for the same act, which is relevant only to the amount of the award .... "
§ 908 at 554. The comment of the court in Eshelnan v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 198, 131 N.E.
675, 678 (1921), in reversing an award for punitive-exemplary damages, merits attention:
"The damages allowed, however, are very large, indeed, [$13,500, mainly as punitive-exem-
plary damages] and far beyond any punishment inflicted by the Criminal Code for the crime
of adultery, which is a fine of a limited amount or a jail sentence. It is true that the Criminal
Code does not control the questions, but there is no distinction between exemplary damages
and damages allowed as a punishment .... and the Criminal Code fixes a punishment de-
signed to be adequate to prevent the offense for the protection of society."
89 It has been suggested that a joinder of actions might obviate that undesirable result.
Morris, supra note 2, at 1194, 1209.
901 SEDGWicK 736. "But a principal or master, though he may be liable for actual dam-
ages arising from the willful or wanton act of his agent or servant, may not be mulcted in
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The court's prolix charge in the Russell case on the liability of the union for
the acts of its "agents" was extremely general and abstruse. To the jury, such
abstractions must have been an impenetrable thicket. What, if anything, the
jury could make of it is very questionable. That the award reflected an under-
standing of the subtle principles involved in the charge is open to grave doubt.
Moreover, the judge failed to charge the jury that the "burden of showing
authorization or approval by the principal is on the plaintiff."91 This is not a
perfunctory omission; such a burden is dictated by experience. 92 To elicit the
truth about the activities and motives of men in a strike is one of the most
difficult tasks assigned to courts. Industrial relations disputes generate the
most sensitive contact between law and emotion. Tempers are frayed and feel-
ings are at a high pitch. In a strike, "feelings on both sides are necessarily
wrought up, and the desire for victory is likely to obscure nice moral questions
and poison the minds of men by prejudice." 93 So spoke one of the most per-
ceptive judges who graced the federal bench.
All that has just been said about the difficulties and the burden of proof
resting on the plaintiff is particularly intensified in the realm of punitive-exem-
plary damages. When juries may permit personal quirks to intrude, not to
mention prejudice, then it is especially important for courts themselves to look
to the quality and genuineness of the proof.94 Merely being "reasonably satis-
exemplary or punitive damages, unless he has either authorized or ratified that act." WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 1340 (Rev. ed. 1937). For a contrary view, see Note, 70 HARv. L. REv.
517, 526 (1957). The author of the foregoing Note, however, points out that thejury "should
be carefully instructed to exclude from consideration all factors except those needed to
achieve the purpose of deterrence." Ibid. Where can one find such primordially pure jurors ?
The rule of respondeat superior is applied to punitive-exemplary damages in many jurisdic-
tions. MCCORMICK 284. McCormick seems to justify the rule on two grounds: (1) "workable
simplicity," and (2) the plaintiff's difficulty in showing wrong doing by "those higher up."
Id. at 285. An ironical situation results. An anomalous doctrine is introduced into the law;
it is then extended without justification because of the difficulty of proof in the particular
instance. Thus anomalies proceed from one to another.
91 Record, pp. 626-30. The trial judge charged that "it is not necessary... that the
agent's authority should be expressly conferred or that the act complained of should have
been ratified." Id. at 626. All that the judge requested in his charge was that the jury be
"reasonably satisfied." The Alabama Supreme Court said that "there need be only a scintilla
of evidence to require reference of the issue raised thereby [presumably the complaint] to the
jury." 264 Ala. 456, 468, 88 So.2d 175, 185 (1956).
92 "Too great caution cannot be exercised in permitting the recovery of punitive damages
for the willful or reckless act of a servant not authorized or approved by the master. The
rule that permits a recovery in such cases is a harsh one, and the plainest principles ofjustice
call for caution in its application .... Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 20, 70 N.E. 953, 954
(1908). Since the necessity for that caution was not articulated by the trial judge in the
Russell case, such caution was not, in all probability, observed by the jury.
93 Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414,416 (D.N.D. 1923) (per Amidon, J.).
94 Courts "ought to exercise a high degree of watchfulness to prevent [the doctrine of
punitive-exemplary damages] from being perverted and extended beyond the real principles
upon which it is based .. " Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 I1. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677
(1921).
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fled," as the court instructed the jury in the Russell case, may not be enough for
such awards. Anything less than clear proof fully sustaining the plaintiff's bur-
den may result in juries awarding punitive-exemplary damages when they are
more interested in keeping unions out of the area than in rendering a fair judg-
ment on the facts. There may be shades of opinion as to the social utility of
trade unions in our society. There is little, if any, basis to warrant endowing
local ad hoc juries with the power to decide whether unions may function
freely or under potentially harsh handicaps. This is a matter of serious legisla-
tive policy for the Congress of the United States to decide and local juries
should not be permitted to arrogate to themselves that right under the guise of
awarding punitive-exemplary damages. Such a doctrine can scarcely be said to
contribute to stability in our society.
It has been said that our "underlying philosophies of liability are in a state
of flux."95 In those circumstances, it is appropriate to inquire whether the doc-
trine of punitive-exemplary damages justifies itself. There is not much evidence
that juries can exercise and utilize this device with proper responsibility,
clarity, or detachment. The role of bias and caprice might be dangerously ele-
vated. A defendant can become a helpless prey and a sport of prejudice.
Violating modem social needs, the doctrine encourages complex neurotic
disturbances instead of desensitizing them. It does not submit itself to reason-
able discipline demanded by legal process. The exceptional cases in which
compensatory damages are slight but the need for imposing liability on a de-
fendant is exigent may be dealt with by requiring the defendant to pay all
plaintiff's legal costs and expenses.
A distinguished philosopher said: "To be ruled by a judge is, to the extent
that he is not bound by law, tyranny or despotism."9 6 How much more tyran-
nous and despotic is it to be subject to the undisciplined rule of juries which
the doctrine of punitive-exemplary damages legalizes.
If the doctrine is to be continued, stringent efforts should be made to make
such awards as scientific as possible. The cloak of sanctity should be removed
from awards that often are begrimed with conscious and unconscious preju-
dice. They should be based on the maximum information available respecting
95 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1232 (1956). The following statement from a staunch sup-
porter of the doctrine is worth noting: "If it had been practicable for the judges to analyze
and define for the jury with precision all the elements of legal harm which enter into every
case, there would have been no necessity for the recognition of the idea of punishment as a
proper end in the administration of the law of civil wrong. But they did not essay this task
and it was felt that the jury should be left to deal with the undefined factors of harm with a
pretty free hand. The doctrine of exemplary damages answered this end well enough for
practical purposes and hence gained currency. As our theory of wrong catches up with the
law of damages, the idea of punishment will appear more and more out of place in the civil
system, and it may possibly in time altogether disappear." STREET, Op. cit. hupra note 51,
at 488.
96 COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 420 (1931). See HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 129
(1920). See also COHEN, op. cit. supra at 421.
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the relationship of punishment to deterrence. That is the tendency in criminal
law today,97 and it should certainly be extended to civil proceedings. If the
problem is hopeless, then the Connecticut rule should be adopted. In any
event, the doctrine should not be extended to labor relations cases. Since
strikes present particularly serious difficulties of proof, inter alia, as to agency
and provocation, and since the doctrine is studded with so many anomalies and
incongruities, the abandonment of the doctrine in labor relations cases might
well be justified, at least in the interest of "workable simplicity."9 8 Otherwise,
the doctrine will only exacerbate labor-management relations and threaten
stability in our society. There may still be an adequate residuum of admonition
in compensatory damages to serve the legitimate aims of tort liability.
97 See Economist, November 11, 1961, p. 532.
98 See note 90 supra.
